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FIGHTING THE LAST WAR: PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT OIL CRISIS
*Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
-- George Santayana, 1906
'History is more or less bunk." -- Henry Ford, 1916
Introduction
Although the term "Energy Crisis" became current only in the 1970s,
the notion of protecting one's energy security has a long and noble
tradition. Yet in fact, concerns about the security of national c-il
supplies have long preoccupied policy-makers, and the policies being
crafted today have seen similar expressions in the past, and the use of
oil as a political weapon hardly originated with the Arab Oil Embargo of
1967.1
While it might be argued that governments have been successful in
their search for energy security in that few factories have shut down or
homeowners frozen to death or military units paralyzed, in fact enormous
economic damage has been done by a combination of the price increases that
occurred in the 1970s, and the wastefulness of the policies imposed in
response to them. This reflects, in part, the competing demands on those
policies, but also the failure of policymakers to understand the nature of
mineral resources, as well as the poor guidance they have received from
analysts. All too frequently, the focus of energy policy on has been on
the reasons for the most recent oil crisis, rather than the probable
causes of the next.
1 In fact, the threat to withhold Middle Eastern oil supplies as a
part of the Arab-Israeli conflict dates to 1947. See Oil and Gas Journal
(OGJ) 12/27/47.
3The Current Vulnerability
"Working abroad in Iran, you can achieve exceptional financial gains,
as well as give yourself and your family the exciting experience of living
in the fascinating 2500-year-old empire long called Persia. The official
language is Farsi, with English widely used. Long politically stable,
Iran has been moving forward a huge, complex program of land reform,
education, and modernization.- --advertisement in February 1978, Journal
of Petroleum Technology [emphasis mine]
Generally, another oil crisis is said to be unlikely today.2 For one
thing, supply is more diversified, and thus less vulnerable. In addition,
there is a large amount of surplus producing capacity available to replace
any that is disrupted. Also, consumers use far less oil than before, and
governments have built up large stockpiles to be released to replace
disrupted supplies.
Yet, all of this is illusory. The diversification of supply reduces
the expected size of any disruption, yet the impact of the size of the
disruption is relative, not absolute. If available replacement capacity
is smaller, than a smaller disruption will have the same effect on the
market as if both are larger, ceteris paribus.
In 1978, the amount of surplus capacity was said to be 6.2 million
barrels per day (mb/d), and the disruption in 1979 involved a loss of
about 6 mb/d for several months, including perhaps .5 mb/d of the surplus
capacity. 3 Yet, this resulted in a two year oil crisis.
2 For example, see "There's Oil Enough in Theory Even if Upper
[Persian] Gulf Closes," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (hereafter PIW)
6/4/84, p. 5.
1978 production was 30.275 mb/d, according to BP Statistical
Review of the World Oil Industry, while the CIA, in International nergy
Statistical Review, (hereafter IESR) 11/29/78, put "maximum sustainable"
capacity at 36.48 mb/d. The capacity figure is only an estimate, one
which has gotten less reliable over time.
4The present situation is not much improved, despite the pervasiveness
of the belief in abundant surplus capacity. Recent reestimates of
capacity in OPEC nations suggests that at any given time, the amount of
capacity outside of Saudi Arabia is only 18 mb/d, leaving current surplus
capacity at 4 mb/d.4 Since the worldwide inventory build from the end of
the first quarter of 1979 to the end of the third quarter in 1980 was
put at 2.4 mb/d, with a quarterly peak of 4.7 mb/d in the third quarter of
1979,5 current levels of surplus capacity can be seen to be insufficient
to prevent another series of price increases in the case of a loss of
Saudi supplies due to war, sabotage, or insurrection. Increased demand
for OPEC oil is unlikely to bring an increase in production capacity in
the short-term, so that the level of surplus capacity available should
decrease for several years to come, especially if low oil prices increase
demand.
Reliance on capacity which is not being produced is also risky, and
not just from the possibility of a lack of political will to produce. In
1967, production capacity in Texas was reported to be 5251 tb/d, about
twice the level of production in May of that year.6 When the Arab Oil
4 See "Oil Safety Margin Shrinking as Spare Output Capacity Dips,"
PIW 8/20/84. IESR, 1/20/86, puts OPEC capacity at 34.4 mb/d, but that
includes Iran at 5/5 mb/d and Iraq at 3.5 mb/d, roughly the pre-war
levels. (They do indicate that the loss in capacity in Iran is
"uncertain" and the Iraqi figure is admitted to be pre-war.)
5 Worldwide stocks were estimated by the Department of Energy and
published in International Energy Indicators, Feb.-Mar. 1982, p. 8. (The
publication has since been replaced by International Petroleum Statistics
Report.)
6 Capacity from Sam H. Schurr and Paul T. Homan, Middle Eastern Oil
and the Western World: Prospects and Problems, Elsevier 1971, p. 40;
production from Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industry Surveys: Crude
Petroleum, Petroleum Products,and Natural Gas Liquids 1967, (hereafter
5Embargo resulted in a loss of 5000 tb/d, the Texas Railroad Commission
authorized an increase in allowable production from 3.2 mb/d to 4.2 mb/d
on July 15, but production peaked at 3.6 mb/d for the month of August.7
Based on this experience, it was subsequently estimated that the 4 mb/d of
surplus capacity was really only about 1 mb/d, and 90 days would be
required to reach that level, with one year needed to bring the full 3.5
mb/d on-line.8 More recently, Texas gas producers found themselves only
able to deliver at 60 percent of their stated capacity during the December
1983 cold wave, although short-term technical problems were said to be the
source of most of the problems. 9
Certainly, the availability of strategic stocks in the United States,
Japan and West Germany will help to ameliorate any loss of supply, but
only if used. Past experience, discussed below, suggests that governments
will be unwilling to release these stocks in time of need, fearing that
the need for them might increase. And the failure to make supplies
available would hardly be new. Consumer governments, fearing a worsening
of the crisis in 1979, sought higher stocks, as discussed below. And in
early 1979, the Saudis reduced production, arguing that the resumption of
Iranian production made their supplies unnecessary, and only threatened to
raise inventories, such as occurred in late 1977 and resulted in
MIS) p. 8.
Production from MIS 1967, p. 8, and the decision cited in Office
of Oil and Gas, U.S. Department of the Interior, Middle East Petroleum
Emergency of 1967, (hereafter MEPE) vol. 1, p. 30.
8 Schurr and Homan, op. cit. NPC 1981, Chapter 4, p. 5, put the lag
time at four to six months, the amount available having declined to 326
tb/d.
World Oil, 4/84, p. 11.
6substantial subsequent market weakness. In fact, the same argument was
used by the Texas Railroad Commission in 1956, when it was reluctant to
allow production to increase because it wanted to reduce what it felt
were surplus inventories.10
Beyond that, the size of the stocks might prove inadequate. The end
of the Iranian Oil Crisis was signalled when storage capacity was full:
companies were physically incapable of accepting any further surplus
supplies and had to reduce purchases.1l The total world stock build in
that crisis was 1.3 billion barrels, about twice the present available
level of government stocks.12 (In the United States, the onshore build
was 250 million barrels, half the current level of the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve.) If filling the companies' storage capacity is what is needed to
reduce panic purchases of oil, then government stocks are not, by
themselves, adequate.
This is all the more true considering the amount of empty storage
capacity still available. In the United States, primary storage capacity
10 Petroleum Press Service, 1/57, p. 2.
11 See "Spot Crude Prices Worn Down Further by Swelling Stocks," PIW
7/14/80, p. 1, which reported "Every nook and cranny in the world oil
supply system is rapidly filling up with surplus crude oil." Companies
were forced to rent tankers for floating storage due to a lack of
available onshore tankage. Private stocks had reached 90 percent of
primary storage capacity at that point. See below.
12 Strategic inventories directly under the control of governments
include 500 million barrels in the United States, about 120 million
barrels in Japan, and 130 million barrels in W. Germany. For U.S. and
Japan, see IESR, 1/28/86, p. 15. W. German government controlled
inventories are required to be no more than 5 percent above 65 days of
consumption, with 1984 consumption at 2 mb/d. See PIW 11/22/82, p. 7, and
IESR 1/28/86, p. 12.
7has declined less than the decline in the amount of primary inventories.13
The amount of empty primary storage capacity in the United States in
March 1986 is roughly 425 million barrels.14 And while secondary and
tertiary inventories are not measured, meaning an exact estimate of unused
storage capacity below the primary level is impossible, it would appear to
be greater than 500 million barrels.15
On a world level, no estimates of foreign storage capacity are
readily available, but the amount of storage capacity available in tankers
is greater than 700 million barrels,16 compared to 650 million barrels in
13 From March 31, 1978 to March 31, 1983, storage capacity fell by
22 million barrels, while primary inventories fell by about 100 million
barrels. (IESR and Monthly Energy Review for inventories, National
Petroleum Council, Petroleum Inventories and Storage Capacity, June 1984,
p. 6 for capacity.) Primary inventories (and capacity) refers to the
storage by oil companies, including refineries, pipelines, and import
terminals, which is measured by the government, among others. Inventories
(and capacity) held b wholesalers and retailers is secondary, while
tertiary refers to consumer inventories (and capacity).
14 Assuming the March 1983 capacity level of 1500 million barrels
has been reduced by 75 million barrels due to closures of refinery
capacity and that the storage capacity was so lost. (It may still be
available, though not immediately. NPC 1984, p. 6, estimated that 60
million barrels of storage capacity could be reactivated within 90 days.
Storage capacity per refinery was calculated from Petroleum Supply Annual
1984, DOE, pp. 81-82, and refinery capacity for January 1, 1983, is from
An-nual Energy Review 1984, DOE, p. 105, and for January 1, 1986, from Oil
and Gas Journal, 1/27/86, p. 74.
15 In NPC 1984, secondary and tertiary inventory capacity was
estimated at 795 million barrels, and inventories at 317 million barrels.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers, particularly, have reduced
their inventories since then due to expectations of lower prices and the
high carrying costs due to high interest rates. See, for example,
Boeing's switch from maintaining up to 30 days of inventories to reliance
on the spot market, "Oil-Price Drop Spurs Many Firms to Switch from Using
Gas, Coal," Wall Street Journal, 4/7/86, p. 1.
16 The OPEC Annual Report 1984, p. 46, put 1984 surplus tanker
capacity at 143 million deadweight tonnes (mdwt), and The Platou Report
3/86, p. 28, lists tanker scrapping at 21 mdwt in 1984 and 31 mdwt in
1985. Assuming that the 1984 surplus is from mid-year and scrapping
81980, despite the scrapping of tankers capable of holding approximately
850 million barrels.1 7 Of course, given an increase in Persian Gulf
exports, tanker use will increase disportionately due to the longer
distances involved, reducing the amount of storage available in the
future.18
Onshore storage capacity is obviously quite large, though there are
no measurements of it, since from mid-1980 until the end of the third
quarter of 1983, inland inventories outside the U.S. had fallen by 700
million barrels.19 Offsetting this, storage capacity fell by as much as
300 million barrels.2 0 While none of these storage estimates is very
continued at the same pace all year, then by the end of 1985, the surplus
would be just over 100 mdwt, which translates into a storage capacity of
over 700 million barrels of oil. The decline in 1985 OPEC exports was
about 1.5 mb/d, which translates into 30-60 mdwt of tanker capacity,
depending on the destinations. The Platou Report only shows about 50 mdwt
of tanker capacity on lay-up, but OPEC is including tankers used for
storage and capacity which is used inefficiently, eg., slow-steamed.
Considering the uncertainty surrounding these numbers, the measurement
should not be taken as definitive.
17 Scrapping from Platou op. cit., and 1980 surplus from OPEC Annual
Report 1981, p. 89, and The Platou Report 1980, p. 8.
18 For example, the distance from Venezuela to New York is 1850
miles, or 5 days of steaming time, while the distance from Saudi Arabia to
the U.S. is 8400 miles, or 23 days of steaming time, assuming normal
speeds of 15 knots. See OECD, Pipelines and Tankers, Paris, 1961, p. 47.
19 From International Energy Indicators and International Petroleum
Statistics Report, Deparment of Energy. It is estimated by the author
that stocks in transit fell by 200 million barrels during this period.
20 Taking storage capacity per refinery in Europe and Japan at the
same level as in the United States, and assuming the reduction in refinery
capacity was matched by closing of the storage tanks. See Lynch, "Export
Refineries and Energy Security in Importing Nations," MIT Energy
Laboratory Working Paper MITEL 85-020WP, December 1985, Tables 1, 3, for
refinery capacity loss. It is possible that some tankage is still in use,
as in the United States where 6% of working storage capacity is located
at closed refineries (representing approximately 25% of the amount of
storage closed over the last 5 years.) See PSA, op. cit.
9accurate, the amount of empty capacity obviously overwhelms the
government-held inventories.
On the demand side, the world is now much less capable of coping with
an oil supply disruption. Because more oil is used in transportation and
less in areas like electricity generation, the ease of switching to
another fuel has dropped substantially, as has the price elasticity of
demand. 2 1 In 1980, the National Petroleum Council estimated that the
second largest source of short-term oil savings in the United States would
be fuel switching from oil by electric utilities, to the extent of 400
thousand barrels per day (tb/d),2 2 but since that time, oil use in the
electric utility sector has dropped by two-thirds.2 3
Examining the changes in demand in the last crisis underlines the
importance of this. As can be seen in Figure 1, most of the reduction in
U.S. consumption in the first year of the Iranian Oil Crisis occurred in
the electric utility sector, even though, in relative terms, it accounted
for only 12% of U.S. petroleum consumption in the first quarter of 1979.24
21 In the OECD, transportation consumption comprised 38 percent in
1973, but had grown to 49 percent by 1983. Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, Paris,
various years.
22 National Petroleum Council's Committee on Emergency Preparedness,
Emergency Preparedness for Interruption of Petroleum Imports into the
United States, February 18, 1981, Chapter 2, page 5.
3 See Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review. See also,
Lynch, "Structural Changes in World Oil Markets and Their Impact on Market
Behavior," MIT Energy Laboratory Working Paper MITEL 86-009WP, March 1986,
pp. 5-7.
24 Data is from Monthly Energy Review. Residential/ commercial data
is 1980 data adjusted to reflect subsequent revision.
FIGURE 1
OIL DEMAND REDUCTION
IRANIAN OIL CRISIS
C 1 R/C IND ,tI 3
BY SECTOR
TRANS ELECT
Source: Monthly Energy Review, Dept. of Energy.
Note: Residential/commercial data adjusted for subsequent
revision.
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The result of the increased share of consumption in low price
elasticity uses is that a higher price increase would be necessary now
than in 1979 to reduce demand to accomodate a given reduction in supply.
(Low oil prices may reverse this trend.)
A scenario for another oil crisis is easy to construct. Table 1
shows an estimated supply/demand balance for the winter of 1986-87, and
the impact that a disruption in Saudi Arabia would have. Since winter
demand on OPEC is likely to be as great as non-Saudi OPEC capacity, the
potential for another crisis is obvious. Low oil prices will only
exascerbate the situation. And since any politically-inspired disruption
of Saudi supplies would imply a threat to other supplies on the peninsula
as well, including the Iraqi pipeline, consumers are likely to fear a
worsening of supplies and build inventories. The supply disruption could
be easily be worse than during the Iranian Oil Crisis, although the impact
on prices will be dependent on demand and government responses.
Table 1
Scenario for an Oil Crisis
Winter 1986-87
(mb/d)
1. 1986 Demand for OPEC oil 17
a. Seasonal addition 2
--with $10-$12 oil
b. incremental demand due to 1
fuel-switching
c. OECD production drop 1
Potential demand on OPEC 21
Potential short-term inventory 3
build in crisis (see text)
Potential total short-term 24
demand in crisis
2. OPEC Capacity 27.5
of which: Saudi Arabia 8.5
Iraqi pipeline .5-1.6*
Kuwait + N.Z. 2.6
U.A.E. 2.1
Qatar .6
Non-Saudi OPEC Capacity 19.0
Capacity perceived at risk 5.8-6.9
if Saudi Arabia disrupted
Unthreatened OPEC Capacity 12.1-13.2
* Capacity end-1985 was .5 mb/d; 1.6 mb/d planned for 1987
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General Energy Policies
"[What was wanted was] an independent source of supply which is, as
far as possible, uncontrolled by any agency which can exact undue
prices....When we surveyed the whole of the oil-fields, it appeared...that
practically the whole area was covered by certain large concessions ....It
was not only a question of the magnitude of those concerns, it was also a
question of whether they were under British congol or foreign or
cosmopolitan control." -- E.G. Pretyman, 1914
*The United States must now be convinced that control over oil
imports and support for indigenous energy resources is vital to its
security and Fedibilty as a world power.' -- Walter
J. Levy, 1970
'[A]s part of our national security interest we need a stress-
domestic oil industry." -- remark attributed to George
Bush in Saudi Arabia, 198627
When it comes to energy policy, Santayana appears to have been
correct: there is nothing but repetition. Of course, concerns about
security of oil supply are very old, with perhaps the earliest focussed
concern about the control of one's oil supplies by foreigners coming from
the British Admiralty, cited above, which did not want to build a fleet
that would be dependent for its fuel on two foreign companies, Royal Dutch
Shell and Standard Oil. But other countries have gone to great lengths to
secure reliable oil supplies.
Jimmy Carter's creation of the Rapid Deployment Force for protection
of our allies in the Persian Gulf (and their oil fields) was hardly
novel: the British dispatched troops from India in 1907 to protect the
25
See Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 63, 6/17/14,
cited in George W. Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and
Economic Controversy, Vanderbilt University Press, 1970, p. 13.
26 "Oil Power," Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p. 663.
27 See "Saudis are Told U.S. Could Shift Its Policy on Oil," Wall
Street Journal, 4/7/86, p. 3.
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Anglo-Persian Oil Company's operations.28 Similarly, the French sought to
protect their domestic shale oil industry in the 1920s from competition
with cheap foreign petroleum. In the 1950s, the United States began
a series of steps that resulted in mandatory oil import quotas to protect
domestic oil production, ostensibly to reduce reliance on unreliable
foreign sources.29
Many of these policies used security concerns, in part, as a
rationale for protectionism. Certainly, this is true of attempts to
protect the domestic coal industry in much of Europe, the interwar shale
oil industry in France, the U.S. domestic oil industry, and the natural
gas industry in Canada.3 0 As a result, it is difficult to find "pure"
examples of policies designed to protect a country from oil supply
disruptions, and even many that have been enacted since 1973 still take on
the form of protectionism and subsidies.3 1
The disruption of oil supplies has a long and honorable tradition as
well. The nationalization of Pemex in 1938 resulted in a loss of supplies
to the world of 25 thousand barrels per day (tb/d), 0.4 percent of world
28
Stocking, op. cit., p. 14.
29 See the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import
Question: A Report on the Relationship of Oil Imports to te National
Security, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1970.
30 The construction of the TransCanada Pipeline was justified, in
part, on grounds of national security; the economics did not support it.
See Leonard Waverman, Natural Gas and National Policy, 1970.
31 Legislation has been proposed in the United States that would
require the maintenance of a "strategic ethanol reserve" equal to 10 of
the SPR, with the obvious intent of bolstering grain prices. See OGJ
Newsletter, 10/21/85.
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production.3 2 Similarly, Mossadegh's 1952 nationalization of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's (BP) concession saw a production drop, this
time of over 300 tb/d, or about 2.6% of world production. 3 3 In fact, the
loss of 500 tb/d of refinery capacity caused more problems than the loss
of crude capacity, something that should be borne in mind by those who
insist that export refineries in OPEC countries do not pose a security
problem.3 4
Oil embargoes also have a long history. Mussolini considered the the
threat by the League of Nations to enact an oil embargo against him over
his invasion of Ethiopia to be serious enough that he threatened war over
the issue,3 5 and the oil embargo which the United States enacted against
Japan in 1941 was a major force in their decision to attack Pearl Harbor.
Despite all of these occurrences, as well as the post-war disruptions
discussed below, energy policy still focuses not on the short-term
disruption of supplies, but on long-term scarcity, which is illusory.3 6
In 1985, when the IEA published its list of energy policy issues, it
included the following:
1) energy efficiency;
2) diversification of energy supplies;
32
Degolyer and MacNaughton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics,
annual.
Ibid. Petroleum Press Service 10/56, p. 358, put the loss of
capacity at a much higher level, 32 million tonnes, or about 640 tb/d.
34 Ibid., and see Lynch, "Export Refineries and Energy Security in
Importing Nations," MIT Energy Laboratory Working Paper 85-020WP, 12/85.
35 See George W. Baer, The Coming of the Italian- Ethiopian War,
Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 115.
36 For a good summary, see M.A. Adelman, "Scarcity and World Oil
Prices," Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
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3) energy pricing and taxation;
4) barriers to energy trade;
5) environmental issues
6) nuclear energy
7) emissions from the burning of fossil fuels in stationary
sources;
8) emissions from motor vehicles; and
9) policy on energy and the environment.
To be sure, there is an entire page devoted to "Arrangements for Oil
Supply Emergencies," 3 8 and the individual country reports, which average
about twenty pages, have one to three paragraphs each devoted to "Energy
Security," including oil inventories. Still, the emphasis has rat changed
much since 1977, when of twelve "Principles for Energy Policy" adopted by
the IEA's governing board, coping with a supply disruption was listed
eleventh.
Many of the policies followed by OECD countries could be
characterized as "buying high and selling low." Most conspicuous is the
attempt on the part of governments to increase the supply of liquid fuel
which they controlled. The U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation is the best
example, having spent billions of dollars with only a trickle of capacity,
mostly shale oil and gasified coal, brought on-line. Similarly, the
Canadian government has spent $7.5 billion in subsidies through 1985 to
promote drilling in the Arctic and Eastcoast Offshore areas3 9, leading to
37
International Energy Agency, Energy Policies and Programmes of
IEA Countries: 1984 Review, Paris, 1985, p. 4.
38 Ibid., p. 18.
39 See "Canada Beset by Huge Cost in Oil Program," Wall Street
Journal, 10/31/83, p. 32, which put costs in the first three years of the
program (through 1983) at $4.4 billion. The Canadian Petroleum
Association, CPA Statistical Handbook 1983, section IV, tables 6 and 11
shows $9.8 billion spent through 1983 n frontier areas, half of it since
the Petroleum Incentives Program began. The share of expenses covered by
PIP has been reported at 80-85 percent.
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the discovery of numerous oil and gas fields, only three of which are
under consideration for development.4 0 The result is that perhaps 250
tb/d of oil equivalent production will be developed, although most of it
will be economic only at prices above $20/barrel of oil.4 1
The Japanese have been active in this regard as well, for similar
amounts of money and with greater but still mixed success. The Japan
National Oil Company has spent over $5 billion in support of exploration
abroad by Japanese oil companies.4 2 However, from a peak of 511 tb/d in
1978, equity production has fallen to 403 tb/d in 1984.4 3 In part, this
reflects a low success rate in exploratory drilling, which is hardly a
policy error. However, the concentration of investment in OPEC countries,
especially Indonesia and Abu Dhabi, means that capacity which was
developed cannot be produced because of government restrictions. The
effect is greatest in Abu Dhabi, where the 500 tb/d Upper Zakum field is
being produced at 20% of capacity. The cost of capacity developed under
40 The Venture natural gas field off Nova Scotia, the Hibernia oil
field off Newfoundland, and the Amauligak oil field in the Arctic. Some
discoveries in the Eastcoast Offshore are still being evaluated.
41 If one assumed that these fields had to bear the entire cost of
exploration, then the subsidy would be equal to about $20 per barrel of
oil equivalent (boe). Development-operating costs will probably be $15-25
per boe, depending on the field.
42 See "JNOC Mainly Instrumental in Promoting Japan's Exploration
and Development Projects," Japan Petroleum Energy Weekly 12/23-30/85,
p. 2.
See "Global Exploration by Japanese Gets Help from Tokyo," PIW
2/24/86, p. 4.
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this policy has been far cheaper than the Canadian PIP program or the
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation.4 4
On the other hand, the Japanese have clearly erred in placing the
capacity in unreliable areas, a symptom of the belief in the immunity of
one's country from an oil supply disruption, discussed in the section
below.
Another aspect of poor commodity strategy has been the tendency for
countries to increase their strategic inventories during periods of market
tightness, then decrease them when the market weakens. As a result, they
(a) worsen oil crises instead of mitigating them; (b) reduce the level of
preparedness for future supply disruptions; and (c) lose money through
what could only be described as a poor investment program.
Strategic oil inventories, whether government- or company- held, have
been employed for decades. Although different countries undertook their
own programs at various times, the European Community enacted a
requirement that member countries hold inventories totalling 90 days of
supply after the 1967 Arab Oil Embargo. Since that time, the IEA has set
up a similar policy, and individual countries still maintain their own
variations.
However, these have undergone considerable revision over the years,
with the amounts held increasing or decreasing depending on a variety of
budgetary considerations as well as the perceived market environment.
Before the 1979 supply disruption, most European countries' stocks were
The subsidy itself translates into $10,000 per daily barrel of
capacity, one-third of the potential cost that the Canadian subsidy
translates into, assuming all three Canadian frontier projects go ahead.
The total spent for exploration and development of this capacity was about
three times higher. See JPEW, op. cit.
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well under the 90 day floor.4 5 After the crisis began, countries
tightened enforcement of the inventory floor requirement, increasing
demand during the period when the market was tightest. Now that the
market is less vulnerable, and prices are lower, most countries are either
reducing their strategic inventories or reducing their purchases for them.
The United States is a good example of this behavior. Before the
Iranian Oil Crisis, only 91 million barrels were purchased for the SPR.
When prices were at their peak in 1981, 122 million barrels were added,
the highest for any year. In 1985, with prices weak, only 42 million
barrels were added, and plans were made to reduce the amount or cease
purchases altogether.4 6
But other countries have behaved in the same fashion, or worse. The
French, who added a number of incremental stocking requirements at the
height of the Iranian Oil Crisis, are now removing them in order to lower
costs to the industry. Since the crisis ended, the government has eased
requirements to allow companies to reduce their inventories by 50 million
barrels, about one-fifth of their pre-crisis holdings.4 7 Sweden and
W. Germany have reduced their government-controlled stocks because of
45
The level of stocks at the end of 1978 in days of 1978
consumption for the following countries was France (83.6), W. Germany
(82.6), Italy (78.7) and Japan (70.4). Since first and fourth quarter
consumption levels are higher than the annual average, the days of
inventories during the actual period of greatest supply disruption were
even lower. See DOE, International Energy Indicators.
46 See "US Stockpile Buying May Go on After All--at Low Rate," PIW
8/12/85, p. 5. Recently, it has been suggested that the U.S. may take
advantage of low prices and make further purchases.
See PIW 9/19/83, p. 6, and 11/11/85, p. 10.
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lower demand levels since the oil price increases. 4 8 Israel is reducing
its emergency stockpile by 10 percent (5 million barrels) for budgetary
reasons,4 9 while lower crude prices at one point reduced the ability of
Japan National Oil Company to buy crude for its stockpile, since its
revenues were related to the price of crude.50
The recent drop in oil prices suggests two things: an opportunity
for governments to buy oil for strategic stockpiles at low prices, and the
possibility that higher imports will increase vulnerability. Past history
suggests, however, that weaker oil prices will make governments more
complacent.
Fighting the Last War: Policies to Cope with Disruptions
"'Mr. Parra [the former Secretary-General of OPEC) doesn't expect any
repetition of the unsuccessful [1967] attempt by the Arab nations to
embargo oil shipments to some Western nations. "I don't believe oil can
effectively be used as a political weapon by withholding supplies from
market--there just canlf be an effective selective embargo.....""' --Wall
Street Interview, 1967
Since World War II, there have been repeated disruptions in the
supply of oil, most minor and technical in nature, but several resulting
in substantial price increases. In formulating policy for the possibility
of a future oil supply disruption, governments and analysts have almost
always focussed on the most recent crisis as a model, and made
preparations to deal with a similar disruption in the future. Yet, each
48 See Platt's OILGRAM NEWS, 12/29/83, p. 2.
PIW 7/29/85, p. 7.
50 Petroleum Economist, 10/83, p. 401.
51 Cited in M.A. Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies
as OPEC Tax-Collectors," Foreign Policy, No. 9, Winter 1972-73, p. 90.
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disruption has been different from the last, and the failure of
policymakers to anticipate this has often resulted in poor policy
formation.
There is one notable exception: the responses to the 1956 Suez
Crisis seemed to have brought on the appropriate actions to ameliorate the
closing of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. These actions
included the construction of tankers large enough to make the Cape of Good
Hope route economical, to some extent the construction of pipelines to
bypass the Canal, and the maintenance of inventories to cover any
short-term oil shortage.52
However, the impact of the Suez Crisis on the oil market has largely
been forgotten. In fact, oil prices increased by about 30 percent (see
Figure 2) as the arrival of about half of Western Europe's oil was
interrupted for 13 days, while tankers made the longer trip around the
Cape of Good Hope. This was the equivalent of an estimated 15-20 million
barrel inventory build as the "pipeline" had to be filled. (See Table
2.)
Post 1967 preparations for an oil crisis ignored the changes that
were occurring in the market. Oil consumption rose drastically, and by
1973 had increased by 17 mb/d, or 56 percent, and over two-thirds of it
had come from the Middle East and North Africa.5 3 The market power of
OPEC had increased, the dependence of the world economy on oil had
increased, and the ability of the producing governments to force their
52 See MEPE, vol. 1, p. 1. As with many of the energy security
policies pursued, such as fuel switching, there were economic forces at
work as well.
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demands on oil companies had been proven by the price negotiations of the
previous three years.
After the 1973 oil crisis, consumers pursued a variety of policies
aimed at reducing their oil consumption and preventing future disruptions
of their supplies. But most countries felt that supplies could be assured
by developing a "special relationship" with one or more producing country
governments. The French carried this to extremes, and were, as a result,
heavily dependent on Iraq for oil supplies by 1979.54
The United States sought to fight any deliberate cutoff rather than
appease the producers, and worked for the creation of the International
Energy Agency, a sub-organization of the OECD, which was intended to allow
consumers to circumvent any embargo. (The French refused to participate,
so as not to damage its carefully cultivated relationship with
producers.) Its Emergency Sharing System is designed to share the
shortfall among members, thus reducing the damage from an embargo and
possibly deterring it.
Of course, the subsequent oil supply disruption in 1979 was a
byproduct of an unrelated political uprising. Carefully cultivated
political relationships proved of no avail as the government of Iran was
forcibly removed from office, and the price of oil went up for everybody,
regardless of their position (or, indeed, involvement) on the Arab-Israeli
conflict. When the Iran-Iraq War began the following year, the French
learned the folly of having excess reliance on one source of oil, no
matter how friendly the government.
22 percent, according to IESR.
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Current Policy Arguments
In the past several years, much of the attention in contingency
planning for energy crises has been focussed on inventory behavior, both
in the private sector and government strategic stockpiles. The 1979-80
oil crisis heightened realization of the role of private inventory
behavior, with the price spike which occurred blamed by some on the
inventory increase which occurred.5 5 Others have argued for the opposite
causality, with rising prices encouraging inventory builds.5 6 Whatever
the direction of causality, the general perception seems to be that
avoidance of inventory build is the crucial strategy to be pursued during
the next crisis.
However, this is simply another example of "fighting the last war".
That is, the policies suggested are designed to address the problems which
appeared during the last crisis, implicitly assuming that those will be
the relevant ones during the next crisis. Thus, the current policies
being drawn up are intended mainly to deal with oil company hoarding.
Aside from questions about the analyses which have been performed, the
probability that the next crisis will take on the aspects of the last one,
or that the market environment will be similar to that of 1979-80, seems
small.
Albert L. Danielson and Edward B. Selby, Jr., "World Oil Price
Increases: Sources and Solutions," The Energy Journal, October 1980.
56 Philip K. Verleger, Jr., Oil Markets in Turmoil: An Economic
Analysis, Ballinger 1982, and R. Glenn Hubbard and Robert Weiner, "The
'Sub-Trigger' Crisis: An Economic Analysis of Flexible Stock Policies,"
Harvard Energy Security Program, June 1982, H-82-07.
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In particular, the possiblity that a two-tier market, with small
amounts of oil moving at spot prices well above the rest of the
officially-priced market, will come into being seems remote. The amount
of oil sold by competitive producers (including the now-deregulated
U.S. market) has greatly increased, and OPEC producers should move more
rapidly to match spot prices next time.
Uncertainty over supplies, the other major theory regarding the
inventory build, seems unlikely to be erased by an SPR release. While the
government might release all 500 million barrels at 3 mb/d for b months,
this would hardly solve all problems. In the first place, a crisis could
involve much more than a need for 3 mb/d of new supplies (see Table 1).
Secondly, the additional supply is not necessarily "certain", any more
than the "additional" Saudi production was in 1979-80. Oil companies
not only would be uncertain that the U.S. government might cut off the
supply at any time (eg., to preserve a strategic minimum) but the reserve
would have an obvious bottom, unlike the Saudi supply. (The uncertainty
of emergency capacity was been discussed above.)
The Profit-Maximizing Theory of Inventory Build
The other major theory which seeks to explain the inventory build in
1979-80 involves analysis performed most notably by Verleger and the
Harvard group.5 7 The basic argument is that, aside from working
inventories, companies maintain speculative inventories. These are
increased when the company expects to be able to sell them at a later date
for more than their original costs plus the costs of holding them. Future
57 Ibid.
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average crude prices are estimated to be the current spot price, lagged by
the amount of time which Verleger estimated it takes for official prices
to reach spot levels.
The flaws in this inventory modelling efforst are perhaps best
illustrated by the Harvard model. While statistically valid (with an r2
of .54 and tstatistics of 2.0 to 5.0 for the different coefficients)
between 1979 and 1981, the actual performance leaves much to be desired.
Out of ten quarterly changes shown, in five quarters the model does not
even predict the right direction of the inventory change. Of t -five
quarters where the sign is correct, two are similar to actual behavior but
the other three are all off by a factor of more than two. From mid-1980,
the simulation's performance worsens (see Figure 3).
The shortcomings are acknowledged by the group, who cite Verleger's
suggestions for his model's failure to achieve statistical significance.
To wit:
" Government policies that require firms to acquire or hold specific
levels of stocks, such as the programs in France and West Germany
(Deese and Miller, 1981) [and the U.S.];
Government programs that mandate sales from large firms to small
firms, such as the U.S. crude oil buy/sell program;
Unanticipated changes in consumer demand that cause unexpected
increases or decreases in consumption;
Abnormal weather, such as warm winters or cold summers, that
reduces or increases normal demands;
The six-week [sic] shipping lag between loading ports and
refineries, which means that a large volume of oil not counted in
inventories is inexorably on its way to the tank 8of refiners and
thus will appear in next quarter's inventories."
This model of market behavior is nonetheless suggestive, and possibly
explains part of the inventory build. However, there are other
explanations that must be considered. For example, the author
58 Verleger, op. cit., p. 120.
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demonstrated elsewhere that overestimated consumption may have explained
39 percent of the 1979 inventory build in the United States. 5 9 As Figure
4 shows, in 1979 and 1980, the overestimate of U.S. demand totalled almost
700 million barrels, far more than the inventory build.6 0 Also, ongoing
disruptions to the supplies of individual companies through contract
expirations, concession nationalizations, etc., may have played a role in
the market tightness which occurred.
Even more important is that the market environment has changed. In
the United States, price controls meant that holding inventories allowed
one to make the aforementioned inventory profits. However, with
decontrol, any oil bought at below-market official prices (or controlled
'old oil' prices) could be sold immediately on the spot market, saving the
holding costs. As Figure 5 shows, the inventory build in the United
States was concentrated in crude oil and gasoline, the two oils subject to
price controls. And, as mentioned, OPEC appears unlikely to hold official
prices down in the advent of another round of spot market price increases.
Conclusions: Achieving Energy Security
Oil supply disruptions have wreaked enormous havoc on all countries
that import oil, that consume oil or that trade with countries that do.
In short, all countries except the exporters. But the damage has been
59 "Stockpiling: Issues and Experience," in Energy and Security and
the State of California. The t-statistics were little better than
Verleger's, however.
60 The figure represents forecasted demand minus actual demand,
expressed in million barrels per year. Both are taken from the January
"Annual Forecast/Review" issue of OGJ.
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economic in nature, resulting from higher prices, not a physical inability
to acquire oil.
Attempts to reduce the amount of oil either consumed or imported will
not prevent another oil crisis, since falling production capacity can
increase the impact of a given loss of supply. Thus, policies favoring
alternative energies and conservation have a limited effect on energy
security.
At the same time, policies aimed at dealing with the short-term
disruptions that lead to higher oil prices have been shortsighted and
focussed excessively on the past, rather than the future. While the world
may be more prepared to deal with the next serious disruption in oil
supplies, this is far from certain.
In essence, most attempts at achieving energy security have focussed
on (1) reducing imports of oil and (2) controlling the source of the
imports with the intent of reducing the political influence of the
exporter and avoiding any loss of supply.
Yet it has been demonstrated that political influence resulting from
economic vulnerability is greatly exaggerated.6 1 Sanctions can inflict
damage on the target, but rarely achieve the desired political results and
usually only when the target is weak. In fact, although oil embargoes
have been carried out against a number of nations, including Israel,
Rhodesia, South Africa, the Netherlands and the United States, the actual
loss of supply to those nations has been minimal, due to the flexible
nature of the oil market.
61 By far the best source on this subject is Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Institute for
International Economics, 1985.
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A loss of supply is theoretically possible, but the circumstances
necessary for it require a virtual state of war, which call for an
entirely different set of policy responses than an energy crisis.
Certainly in 1941, when the international oil market was controlled by the
United States and Great Britain, an embargo could be effective, but such
an environment has not existed for decades and is unlikely to be seen
again.
The economic damage caused not by embargoes but from the loss of
supply, estimated at as much as $2 trillion, is the appropriate target of
energy security policies. Encouraging conservation and domestic energy
production will provide some protection from oil price increases, but such
policies must be weighed in these terms, not as protection from loss of
supply. The costs and benefits of an import tax can and should be
compared with similar policies such as a strategic petroleum reserve.
